Hollande, Homework, and the Death of Childhood

Recently, French President Francois Hollande has proposed a ban on homework because he thinks it disadvantages students from poorer backgrounds whose parents tend to be less involved and less supportive in their education. Hollande’s rather socialist point hits on the inequality in educational outcomes that can come from involving the home environment in the educational process. Many people point out that slowing the progress of the advantaged to create equality diminishes total societal educational output (though they don’t usually phrase it quite like that), and I would agree with them, except for one small issue–homework does not help kids learn, and is corroding the work ethic and academic passion of an entire generation of students.

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The TV Licence Gestapo

It’s that time again–no, not for the wheel of morality, but for the British government’s annual welcoming of students back to university. Is it a reduction in tuition fees? A care package full of sweets? An expression of thanks to the international students for helping to keep tuition costs down for everyone else? None of these things. It’s a friendly letter from the TV Licencing Authority. Two friendly letters, in fact, which I received this year on the very same day. One is from September, which happens to be before term started, and it informs me of the British practise of TV licencing–the requirement that all people in the UK who watch live television purchase a TV licence, the proceeds of which goes to fund the BBC. The other, apparently from this month, tells me that last month I received a letter and took no action, and that consequently I am now under “investigation”, an investigation which “could lead to a summons, a court hearing, or a fine of up to 1,000 pounds plus legal costs”. I am unfazed by this–at the start of each academic year, the TV Licencing Authority threatens me (and everyone else at the university who hasn’t bought a TV license) with an investigation. Every year I inform them that I do not require a licence (I do not own a TV in Britain and watch no live television on my laptop), every year they tell me they may stop by to ensure that I’m not lying, and every year they don’t actually bother to do that. This is not a very pleasant way of interacting with HM Government, to be accused of trying to steal British television right off the plane. In my home country, the United States, we don’t bother with TV licences at all, and so I always find myself reacting to these letters with the thought that well, this is a sort of stupid way to fund the BBC–surely there is a superior alternative? I propose that there is indeed a much more sensible way to do it that does not involve falsely accusing piles and piles of people of fraud, and that proposal follows.

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Democratic Illegitimacy

Democratic theorists are fond of saying that democracy has a unique claim to legitimacy because it is the only system of government that can be accepted by all reasonable people without qualifications. Today I will illustrate precisely what this argument says and then endeavour to kill it via a metaphor I call “Mount Democracy”.

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Personal Responsibility and Moral Hazard

Today I attended a lecture on the political philosopher Ronald Dworkin, and it made me think some new thoughts with regard to the concept of personal responsibility. Traditionally, I have found myself thinking the concept has relatively little merit, but in this post I would like to reconsider this position and precisely where my view on the just society stands with regard to it, to and Dworkin more broadly, specifically considering moral hazard–the notion that, without some level of personal responsibility, there is long-term damage to people’s sense of duty to society and consequently to societal outcomes.

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Intuition versus Utility

A lot of people in politics, particularly political theory, have used the objection “this doesn’t feel right” as a counter to logical arguments. The primary victims of this line of emotion-led reacting have been the utilitarian and consequentialist moral theorists. “This is conducive to the general welfare for reasons X, Y, Z” is often met with “well sure, but I just don’t like that”. This sort of reaction is typically treated as a legitimate argument, but does it deserve this level of standing? Today, I intend to argue that it does not.

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