The Oregon Rebels are Guilty of Sedition, Not Terrorism
by Benjamin Studebaker
In Oregon, members of Cliven Bundy’s paramilitary organization have seized and occupied the headquarters building of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, which belongs to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, a federal agency. Many people are calling Bundy’s rebels “terrorists” and accusing the media of treating them differently because they are white. Their point is well-intentioned–it is true that violent criminals from Middle Eastern backgrounds are more readily presumed to be terrorists by the press. But the argument is ill-applied to this particular case. The law is very clear–the Oregon rebels are guilty of sedition, not terrorism.
To start, let’s be clear about what’s happening in Oregon. A fellow named Dwight Hammond owns some land that borders some public property. The Hammonds have allegedly prevented a fence from being constructed between the two parcels, threatened government officials, committed arson, and poached protected deer. They were convicted of the arson, but because the damage was not severe they were initially given three month jail sentences. The case was appealed by the prosecutor, and the appellate court ruled that the mandatory minimum 5 year sentence for arson on public property must be upheld. The Hammands tried to appeal to the Supreme Court, but they were turned down. In a separate civil suit, the Hammands were also required to pay $400,000 in damages. Here’s Hammond and his son:
The decision to uphold the mandatory minimum sentence was deeply unpopular with the public, and 2,000 people signed a petition in an attempt to get President Obama to grant the Hammonds clemency. The Hammonds are serving their sentences and have paid the damages required by the court. Mandatory minimum sentencing laws unnecessarily increase the US prison population and keep many people incarcerated for long periods for relatively minor offenses. There’s a robust debate to be had about whether the Hammonds should have gotten 5 years or 3 months.
Cliven Bundy leads a rebel organization–many rebels are themselves members of the Bundy family. The Bundy rebels offered to assist the Hammonds. The Hammonds explicitly rejected their assistance, but the Bundy rebels decided to take action anyway, ostensibly on the Hammonds’ behalf. Armed people began arriving from out of town. Led by two of Bundy’s sons (though not Cliven Bundy himself), some of these people separated from a peaceful demonstration on January 2nd and began occupying the Malheur facility. There was no one in the building at the time and no one was hurt. They claim to have a strength of about 150, but media reports have varied, putting the figure at “between 6 and 12” or “between 12 and 25”. They demand that the government release the Hammonds and relinquish the Malheur National Forest so they can open it for logging. Here’s Bundy:
This might look like a standard occupation, familiar to left-wing protesters, if not for two key differences:
- The occupants are armed.
- The occupants have explicitly stated their willingness to “kill and be killed” if the government attempts to remove them.
The local county sheriff puts it this way:
These men came to Harney County claiming to be part of militia groups supporting local ranchers, when in reality these men had alternative motives to attempt to overthrow the county and federal government in hopes to spark a movement across the United States.
This is extremely serious, but does it fit the definition of terrorism? Most of the time, we should define terms in the way that’s most useful. Many of the people who want to call these rebels “terrorists” want to do so because it helps them make a legitimate political point about differences in media treatment of violence when it’s committed by different groups. But when we’re talking about whether a person is guilty of a crime, we cannot use a vague definition of terrorism like “willing to kill people in service of a political cause” even if that definition may feel intuitive or useful to us. Instead, we have to look at the legal definition for terrorism.
To be an “act of terrorism” in the legal sense, a violent act must meet four criteria:
- Premeditated
- Politically Motivated
- Aimed at Civilians
- Carried out by Non-State Actors (not the police or military of a sovereign state)
The Bundy rebels only meet 3 out of the 4. They have not harmed any civilians and have only expressed a willingness to use violence against government forces. They are not terrorists. Their actions do however most definitely meet the legal definition of a seditious conspiracy. My old copy of Black’s Law Dictionary defines seditious conspiracies this way:
A criminal conspiracy to forcibly (1) overthrow or destroy the US government, (2) oppose its authority, (3) prevent the execution of its laws, or (4) seize or possess its property.
The Bundy rebels’ actions are a seditious conspiracy if they fit even one of these four senses of the term, and arguably their actions fit all four senses. In the US, seditious conspiracy carries a sentence of up to 20 years.
So far, the Bundy rebels have not done anything serious enough to merit the far more serious charge of treason, which in the United States has this very limited definition:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.
The Bundy rebels have not killed anyone yet, so they certainly cannot be said to be levying war (which requires violence on a scale that is beyond their very limited capacities), and they are not affiliated with any foreign enemies of the state, so they cannot be said to be giving aid and comfort.
The Bundy rebels should be arrested, charged, and convicted of seditious conspiracy. The state should try to do this peacefully, if possible, initially through negotiation. Should the rebels continue to resist, the state could try to cut supplies of power and water, block all routes in and out, and lay siege to the facility. The state should only resort to violence if the Bundy rebels fire upon its agents. Under no circumstances can the Bundy rebels be allowed to get away with what they have done–this is the second time members of the Bundy family have attempted to provoke an armed confrontation with the state. In 2014 they engaged in an armed standoff with the Bureau of Land Management in Nevada. The government failed to adequately establish that armed resistance will not be tolerated–to date no members of the Bundy family have been convicted in connection to the 2014 standoff, and the government even acceded to some of their lesser demands. A few months later, two individuals who participated in the 2014 standoff attacked and murdered 2 police officers and one wannabe hero in Las Vegas, before they were gunned down by law enforcement. For the sake of the rule of law, it is imperative that the government come down much harder on the Bundy rebels this time. Arrest them. Charge them. Convict them. Incarcerate them.
In the meantime, we need to be careful that in our rush to eliminate inequalities in the way the press treats violent criminals of different races we do not begin subjecting white criminals to the same rushed evaluations that we too often apply to Middle Easterners or blacks. The problem is not that the media is being too nuanced or deliberating too heavily about what the Bundy rebels are–it’s that some media outlets often don’t bother to do this anywhere near as thoroughly when the culprit is from a disadvantaged background. Treating white criminals worse may achieve equality, but it’s not the sort of equality we should aim for. We should achieve equality by treating criminals from disadvantaged backgrounds better–we should never level down.
Benjamin Studebaker 
[…] The Oregon Rebels are Guilty of Sedition, Not Terrorism | Benjamin Studebaker […]
huh,why do these people feel that they are entitled to free access to public land.I expect they get land subsidies as well.
Although the 5-year prison term seems harsh for minor arson.Unreasonable and ill advised.
These problems would be less likely to occur if right to access land was managed through a land value tax(with a reduction on other taxes).
It is silly to call them terrorists .
I concur with your conclusion that every single member of the Bundy mob should be vigorously pursued, prosecuted, and convicted as the criminals they are. Sedition is only one of the charges. Still, I’m not sure it’s relevant whether, as you argue, the Bundy mob fails to meet your definition of “terrorist.” That word has become so abused and misused (principally by the corporate mass media) as to become nearly worthless — at least in public discourse — except as a sly synonym for “Muslim” or “black” or “racial minority.”
I don’t recall seeing many newscasters calling James Holmes a “terrorist.” Or Dylann Roof. Or Eric Robert Rudolph. Or, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold? Yet, I would think each one of those criminals would have fit your artificial definition of “terrorist.” If the distinction is without a meaningful difference, of what use is it?
The sparsely settled, largely desert-like areas of southeastern Oregon and the high forested foothills of the Cascades for decades have sheltered a number of outlaw “survivalist” camps. Each numbers as many as a hundred or more. Think motorcycle gangs without many motorcycles. They are armed, dangerous, and fundamentally lawless. Some among them have assaulted and killed civilians, including Forest Service workers and Park rangers. Their very presence intimidates and (rightly) frightens civilians.
A not inconsiderable number among them are authoritatively believed to be fugitives from justice or escapees from incarceration. Their grotesque (mis)understanding of constitutional and statutory law is virtually identical to that of the notorious avowed Nazi Richard Girnt Butler of Hayden Lake, Idaho, (now deceased). Was he not a terrorist simply because he was never convicted of murdering a civilian? Not in my book.
To be clear, it’s not my definition–it’s the federal government’s. I emphasize the government’s definition because these people have been accused of committed specific crimes, and to judge whether they are legally guilty of those crimes we have to use the legal definition. You can certainly argue that the legal definition could or should be different, though I would push back a little bit–it’s imprecise to define terrorism so vaguely that nearly any violent person can be classified as a terrorist, and many lay definitions of terrorism often fall into that. A wider definition might also allow the government to treat too many garden-variety murderers and mobsters the way terrorists are treated (indefinite detainment, enhanced interrogation, etc.).
James Holmes is a mass-murderer, but not a terrorist because his crimes were not politically motivated.
Dylann Roof targeted his victims for political reasons and was indeed a terrorist. Same goes for Eric Rudolph, definitely a terrorist.
Harris and Klebold did not have political motives as far as I know–they’re garden variety mass shooters.
Most of the biker gangs do not have political motivations–they’re a form of organized crime, like the mob.
The FBI does consider Butler’s group a “terrorist threat” even though Butler himself was never convicted of terrorist acts. I think we could, in accordance with the legal definition, argue that Butler was the leader of a terrorist organization and that he therefore aided and abetted terrorist acts. He was charged with seditious conspiracy once, but the jury did not convict him (I’d argue that was a mistake).
A looser lay definition of terrorism might include all of these people and deeds under the heading of terrorism, but I think that would obscure the differences among various kinds of violence. Just because someone isn’t a terrorist doesn’t mean their violence is any less deplorable–violent murderers who are not terrorists often commit acts that are just as morally despicable as the acts of people who meet the legal standard, if not more so.
To be sure, the federal government’s “definition” of “domestic terrorism” is exceedingly elastic and variable. Some sources cite as many as a hundred or more different definitions. But one principle statute, 18 U.S.C. §1331(B), defines it this way:
[T]he term “domestic terrorism” means activities that —
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended –
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
The subsections of (B) are conventionally written in the alternative, thus allowing the definition to include acts “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population… within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” regardless of motive.
That makes sense, partly because your suggestion that a “political” motive is required seems no more helpful in distinguishing truly horrific violent crimes that “intimidate or coerce a civilian population” from garden variety violence by a convenience store stick-up man, an enraged spouse, or a gang of Wall Street stock brokers who plan to rob a Brink truck.
Would violence in 1659 by Protestants against Quakers by hanging them all on Boston Common be sufficiently “political” for you? Is it a “political” motive for a palpably insane Robert Dear to assassinate a dozen people in a Planned Parenthood clinic ‘for the babies?’ Is a criminal who releases sarin gas to kill over a dozen riders in a Tokyo subway any less a terrorist because he didn’t give a hoot about politics but rather acted to fulfill what he sees as a biblical doomsday prophecy?
Of course, one can expand the meaning of a “political” motive to include such lunacies. But if so, how much easier is it to ascribe a “political” motive to outlaws who openly avow hatred of the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. Park Service, and similar agencies because they want free land for the taking or, as I have described in my first comment, simply are out-and-out sociopaths determined to have their way at the point of a gun if necessary and are willing to kill scores to achieve whatever aim they may have.
Motivations matters because if we understand a person’s motivations we are more able to effectively respond and predict behavior. It is not useful to lump together people who kill for political reasons with people who kill for money, due to insanity, for revenge, for honor, and so on. If we want to understand and reduce violence in our society, each kind of violence must be understood on its own terms. The definition for terrorism ought not to be about how the terrorized feel (any violent act can make a person feel terrorized), it ought to be about the purpose of the violence, the motivations of the actor, the kind of threat the actor is and the best means of response.
Terrorist or not?
Well, it is like a”DUCK”, it walks like a “DUCK” but we still can not call it a “DUCK”.
I’m not sure the reports were true, but you might want to check into reports of Harry Reid and his son or son and law trying to negotiate a real estate deal with China regarding the federal land or something to that effect. I remember it being reported during the standoff, but not all of the details. Seems some sort of endangered turtle was somehow woven into the story. I do know when I lived in Idaho, which I loved, there was a definate spirit of self reliance and individual rights, that just wasn’t considered a bad thing then. Never even thought of locking my door living in the middle of nowhere in the foothills of the Grand Tetons. Worked and lived alongside cowboys, migrant workers and blackfoot Indians in my job with Legal Aid. If there were tensions I never knew it.
Whoever wrote this has no idea what they are talking about. Under, 18 U.S. Code § 2331 the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that— (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C)occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
There is no element of targeting civilians. Indeed, all the elements listed in the blog are incorrect. Indeed, one can be convicted of both sedition and terrorism. They are not mutually exclusive. “In the legal sense” he is 100% incorrect.
That’s the technical definition, but in practice the US government does not generally charge people with domestic terrorism unless they meet all four of the criteria I listed.
The Independent recognizes this:
http://i100.independent.co.uk/article/an-armed-white-militia-has-threatened-violence-in-oregon-so-are-they-terrorists–W1b0NMi0sg
So does Salon:
http://www.salon.com/2003/04/17/terrorist_act/
Even if the government decided to interpret 2331 unusually broadly, a prosecutor would almost certainly fail to get a conviction under 2331 because the Bundy rebels have not yet actually carried out any violent acts, so they have not yet been involved in “acts dangerous to human life” and would therefore fail to meet A. The law against seditious conspiracy is perfectly designed to handle a case like this.
Why should I care about what two publications believe? Do they have any authority on the matter? No. If you click the link in the salon article it links to nothing. The Independent article links to the salon article. Moreover, the independent article states that the US government traditionally uses those four criterial which, by its terms, means that on occasions it does not use those criteria. Clearly those criteria are not dispositive.
Additionally, it is not clear what is meant but the “US Government.” However, if we read the salon article, the source cited to by the Independent, it becomes clear that it is only “intelligence and law enforcement agents” that use these criteria. However, the opinion of law enforcement agents has no baring on the question at hand: Whether they are committing acts of terrorism, a legal term defined by statute, not law enforcement.
You state that “to be an “act of terrorism” IN THE LEGAL SENSE, a violent act must meet four criteria…” This statement is patently false. Intelligence and law enforcement agents have no authority to define or legislate the definition of crimes. Their decision to only investigate terrorist activity that meets certain criteria has no baring on whether said activity meets the legal definition of the crime.
Again you misstate the elements of the offense. Nowhere in the definition does it state that one must have engaged in violent acts. he statute merely states that the party must engage in acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State. Under your theory, if someone held an airplane full of people hostage under threat of a fake explosive device, they could not be charged with terrorism. This is clearly not the case. By definition, the perpetrator need not have engaged in violent acts, but must have engaged in acts dangerous to human life. Typically, using a deadly weapon in furtherance of a crime is an act dangerous to human life. This added danger to human life is precisely why we sentence people harsher when they use weapons in furtherance of a crime.
The opinion of US law enforcement agents is the only opinion that matters, because it is the opinion of US law enforcement that determines whether someone can and will be tried on terrorism charges.
I mention violent acts because acts that are dangerous to human life are invariably violent. There are exceptions–I would consider taking hostages w/o violence to be an exception. The Bundy rebels did not take any hostages, however. Nor did they face any opposition when they occupied the structure. The fact that they have occupied a Federal structure by force (i.e. with weapons) makes them guilty of seditious conspiracy, but not terrorism.
“The opinion of US law enforcement agents is the only opinion that matters, because it is the opinion of US law enforcement that determines whether someone can and will be tried on terrorism charges.”
1) Prosecutors can bring charges without law enforcement agents filing a criminal complaint or making an arrest first. LEO’s do not have final decision making authority in this regard. That they choose to devote their resources to investigating only a subset of crimes does not mean that charges can’t be brought on the remainder.
2) Whether someone will is eventually tried is not the issue. There may be any number of reasons why someone is not tried for a crime they commit, that is no reason to describe someones actions differently. If I rob a bank but, in exchange for offering information or testimony, I am not charged or tried, would you still not call my actions bank robbery? The issue here is what these men are doing under our laws, not what they will ultimately be charged with.
“I mention violent acts because acts that are dangerous to human life are invariably violent. There are exceptions–I would consider taking hostages w/o violence to be an exception. The Bundy rebels did not take any hostages, however. Nor did they face any opposition when they occupied the structure.”
-Acts that are dangerous to human life are not invariable violent (if we understand violent to mean using or involving physical force that’s intended to hurt/damage/kill someone). Many acts that are dangerous to human life are merely negligent or reckless and don’t involve acts intended to harm. The threshold for the statute is facially less than an overt violent act. That the bundy rebels have not faced any opposition is precisely because they are armed and engaged in acts that threaten human life. Indeed, the Harney County Sheriff’s Office stated, “We ask that people stay away from the refuge for their SAFETY.” These people are resisting arrest in the most violent way possible, by threat of lethal force. Surely such act is both violent and endangering to human life. Threats against human life are the only thing allowing them to perpetuate their crimes. They are essentially engaged in armed robbery.
Prosecutors do not generally flagrantly disregard legal precedent, and when they do they are generally rebuffed by the courts.
If you commit what we casually call robbery but are not tried and convicted, you have not committed a robbery in the eyes of the law. The actions you have taken may be referred to as robbery by other people, but this does not make them robbery in the eyes of the law. They do not become robbery in the eyes of the law without a conviction.
Reckless acts that are not intended to cause harm are obviously not terrorism, which is one reason why the government is right to make use of the 4 criteria to narrow the usage.
The Bundy rebels faced no opposition when they seized federal property because no federal workers were there at the time. By “opposition” I do not necessarily mean forcible opposition–I simply mean people who are physically present that would have to be removed or coerced into allowing them to occupy the building.
Resisting arrest for political purposes is not terrorism unless you do it by targeting civilians. Removing that limitation turns potentially any instance where someone resists arrest into a terrorist act and opens the law to innumerable abuses by government prosecutors. Armed robbery isn’t terrorism either, and the fact that you could compare this to armed robbery and then call it terrorism only further emphasizes how muddled and overly expansive your interpretation is.
There is a terrific name already available for what this crime is–seditious conspiracy. Why do you feel the need to widen the traditional interpretation of the terrorism law so that virtually any person who puts any other person in danger can potentially be accused of being terrorist? What purpose does this serve?
1) How a law enforcement agency decides to allocate its resources is NOT legal precedent nor is it binding legal authority. Moreover, by their own accounts these added criteria are general guidelines on how they choose to investigate cases of terrorism not binding statements of policy regarding what constitutes terrorism in the legal sense. Additionally, the articles you site to seem to acknowledge imperfect adherence to these guidelines.
2) “If you commit what we casually call robbery but are not tried and convicted, you have not committed a robbery in the eyes of the law. The actions you have taken may be referred to as robbery by other people, but this does not make them robbery in the eyes of the law. They do not become robbery in the eyes of the law without a conviction.”
Yes of course they should be afforded the presumption of innocence, that is not what we are discussing. By that same token, they are seditionists either, since they have not been tried and convicted of that sedition. Clearly, that is not the discussion we are having. We are talking descriptively not as a judgement on the probability of later findings of guilt or innocence.
3) “Resisting arrest for political purposes is not terrorism unless you do it by targeting civilians.”
False. READ THE STATUTE. intending to intimidate or coerce civilians is but ONE of three potential intents necessary to elevate a crime to the level of terrorism. As relevant here, criminal acts that endanger human life do rise to the level of terrorism if said acts are intended “TO INFLUENCE THE POLICY OF A GOVERNMENT BY INTIMIDATION OR COERCION.” This is clearly the bunny’s stated purpose. Mere passive resistance of arrest, by its very terms, does not endanger life and thus fails to meet the first prong of the statute. Even most violent resistance would not rise to the level of terrorism unless coupled with one of the enumerated intents. People rarely violently resist arrest to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, usually the intent of their resistance is to simply to avoid arrest. Here, you have violent resistance coupled with the necessary intent, the intent to influence the policy of a government by intimidation and coercion.
4) “Reckless acts that are not intended to cause harm are obviously not terrorism”
False. Acts that recklessly endanger human life that are intended to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion are terrorism. Here is an example to make this more clear: Let’s say that I hold a school full of children hostage using a fake bomb, and I refuse to release my prisoners until the government releases all the prisoners in Guantanamo. The government refuses to negotiate with terrorists and in the ensuing raid innocent children are accidentally shot and killed by SWAT team officers. Now the bomb was fake, and their death was unintentional. However, my actions recklessly endanger their life. (i.e. my conscious objective was not for these kids to die and I did not enter into these actions knowing that they would necessarily die, but I consciously disregarded the risk to their life). You are saying that in this scenario it would be inappropriate to charge me as a terrorist because my actions were merely reckless?
5) “Armed robbery isn’t terrorism either, and the fact that you could compare this to armed robbery and then call it terrorism only further emphasizes how muddled and overly expansive your interpretation is.”
Again, false. This is not an interpretation; this is a plain reading of the statute. Under the definition, ANY crime that endangers human life is terrorism, IF BUT ONLY IF, the perpetrator intended “(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping is terrorism.” It’s this added level of intent that our representatives decided is the sine qua non of terrorism, and that intent is clearly manifest in the bundy gang.
6) “Why do you feel the need to widen the traditional interpretation of the terrorism law so that virtually any person who puts any other person in danger can potentially be accused of being terrorist? What purpose does this serve?”
As stated above, I have not widened anything, i’ve merely presented a plain language reading of the statute. The “traditional interpretation” is the interpretation that was passed by our duly elected representatives and signed by our democratically elected president. The traditional interpretation is not that of unelected law enforcement agents. While law enforcement is free to allocate their resources in ways they feel will be most effective, say by focusing on acts of terror that are aide at civilians, law enforcement does not have the power legislate. What purpose does it serve by claiming that unelected FBI agents can override the will of congress and re-write our criminal laws?
We’re not merely talking about how law enforcement allocates resources–prosecutors traditionally do not charge people with terrorism in these cases and courts do not traditionally convict them–nor should they.
By contrast, if these people are arrested, prosecutors could charge them with sedition w/o violating precedent, and the courts could convict them w/o violating precedent.
I’ve already dispensed with your interpretation of the statute (as no one uses it in the way you’re suggesting), so I can simply state resisting arrest for political purposes is not terrorism as it is understood by law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges. E.g. if you try to arrest protesters and those protesters resist arrest, you are not and cannot charge the protesters with terrorism. You can charge them with resisting arrest, possibly with assaulting or murdering an officer, and potentially with seditious conspiracy.
Taking hostages endangers human life irrespective of whether or not the hostage-taker is armed. If a police officer shoots a hostage, that doesn’t make the hostage taker a murderer.
When a plain reading of a statute leads to obviously ridiculous consequences, courts generally do not read statues plainly. That is why we have these guidelines for when to apply the terrorism law, and we should be very grateful that courts adhere quite strictly to them.
1) “prosecutors traditionally do not charge people with terrorism in these cases and courts do not traditionally convict them–nor should they.”
-Please cite to your data. Neither of the articles you referenced talked about prosecutors or courts. You should note that traditionally, implies that sometimes they do indeed charge people with terrorism in these cases.
2) By contrast, if these people are arrested, prosecutors could charge them with sedition w/o violating precedent, and the courts could convict them w/o violating precedent.
-What precedent?? You have not cited to any case law so far. Please, show me the case law that construes the statute more narrowly.
3) “so I can simply state resisting arrest for political purposes is not terrorism as it is understood by law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges. E.g. if you try to arrest protesters and those protesters resist arrest, you are not and cannot charge the protesters with terrorism. You can charge them with resisting arrest, possibly with assaulting or murdering an officer, and potentially with seditious conspiracy.”
-Again, where are you getting this from? The article you cited to does not talk about prosecutors and judges, only law enforcement officers. In any event, I agree that resisting arrest for a political purpose is not terrorism under the statute. The litmus test is not whether you merely have a political purpose, it’s whether you endanger someone with the intention of thereby influencing the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion. However, this is not a case of resisting arrest. This is a case of armed revolutionaries storming a federal facility, holding siege to federal land, and demanding, under threat of violence, that the government release political prisoners and change its policies regarding public land management.
4) “If a police officer shoots a hostage, that doesn’t make the hostage taker a murderer.”
-Wrong. You are ill-informed, and I’m guessing that you are not a lawyer. Clearly, u’ve never heard of transferred intent and the felony murder rule
5) “When a plain reading of a statute leads to obviously ridiculous consequences, courts generally do not read statues plainly. That is why we have these guidelines for when to apply the terrorism law, and we should be very grateful that courts adhere quite strictly to them.”
What is the ridiculous consequence here? Armed revolutionaries storming a federal facility, holding siege to federal land, and demanding, under threat of violence, that the government release political prisoners and change its policies regarding public land management. Moreover, the local schools have shut down and the local citizenry reportedly claims they are living in fear? This seems like an application of the statute that was wholly considered by congress.
“That is why we have these guidelines for when to apply the terrorism law”
-Source? Please, cite any data to show that courts strictly adhere to the guidelines set by unelected law enfacement officers, and not the law as passed by congress? Please, can you cite to any data for this proposition? Any case law where a court ratified law enforcement’s criteria? Or are you just blowing smoke…
Give a counterexample, I’d be very interested to hear about any person who has been charged and convicted of terrorism where it does not meet the 4 criteria. Otherwise, I’m not really interested in continuing this, because I think the interpretation you’re advancing is obviously unreasonable and I don’t really feel compelled to continue defending that.
“Give a counterexample, I’d be very interested to hear about any person who has been charged and convicted of terrorism where it does not meet the 4 criteria.”
-Ughm any case of terrorism that is religiously motivated….
I don’t care what you think is unreasonable. What you find reasonable is irrelevant. United States Code disagrees with you. That the law has other definitions of terrorism for other purposes does not matter. For criminal law purposes, the only definition that matters is that found in title 18 of the US Code.
You make several unsupported empirical claims (ie. courts adhere quite strictly to them, prosecutors traditionally do not charge people with terrorism in these cases and courts do not traditionally convict them, courts generally do not read statues plainly….). Since this is so “traditional” and if courts are interpreting title 18 of the criminal code differently as often as you say, then it should be relatively easy for you to produce some data or case law. Please, cite to a single case that reinterprets the criminal definition of terrorism.
Religious terrorism always has a political component. You can’t even find one? Not even an exception to the rule?
Again you are showing your ignorance. Religious terrorism does NOT always necessarily have a political component. Indeed, this distinction is recognized in US law. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Defense’s definition of terrorism recognizes this fact. Moreover, you’ll note that the FBI DOES NOT use your definition but instead adopts the legal definition of terrorism (https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition)
Not hard to find a counter example. See the 2007 fort dix terror plot, which clearly was not targeted at civilians.
Odd how you claim that courts routinely abandon the legal definition of terrorism, but you can’t cite to a single case too back up your claim. If it happens as often as you suggest, it should be a relatively easy task for you. Instead you’d rather waste time spreading lies and disinformation on the internet.
Give me an example of a religious terrorist act that does not have a political component. I can’t think of one.
The Fort Dix folks were charged with conspiracy to murder members of the armed services, they were not charged with terrorist acts. Got anything better?
Every case we’ve discussed backs up my claim. Every time anyone gets charged with terrorism in the United States, it meets the 4 criteria. This is not an “abandonment” of the definition, it’s a decision by law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts to interpret the law in a limited, reasonable, measured way.
This is a good discussion. Benjamin, I agree that the protesters are guilty of sedition, however I also think there is a case to be made for terrorism. While legal interpretation of the terrorism may historically rest on the four points, I would argue that the protesters, as a self described militia, 1) meet the criteria of an “armed conflict between military forces of any origin”; 2) that they are attempting to intimidate or coerce the civilian population (civilians are not able to make use of public lands due to the armed occupation); 3) are attempting to influence goverment policy through intimidation and cohersion; and finally, I think we can all agree that 4) their acts are illegal. The law is open to interpretation and evolution as it is tested through jurisprudence. I believe the points I’ve made should be argued in court.
There is also a case to be made for treason in that this is an armed occupation by a self described militia of US territory. The militia men and women have identified the US goverment as their foe and hoped to incite a broader uprising of militia across the country. In my reading, this is akin to an act of war. If shots need to be fired, the events of January 26, 2016 in which gunfire was exchanged in the apprehension of the group’s leadership should suffice.
Finally the militia members are rejecting the rule of law, have taken up arms against law enforcement and goverment agents. While they argue they are “defending the US Constitution” I would submit that one cannot defend what one is intentionally and willfully disregarding to achieve their self serving ambitions..
I would challenge the claim that their use of the word “militia” necessarily makes them into a military force, and the claim that they are attempting to intimidate or coerce civilians is a stretch (have they denied civilians access to the property? I remember reading a story from a journalist who pointed out that as a citizen, the land belonged to him too, and they reluctantly granted him access). The violence that happened the other night was in a confrontation with the police, not with civilians. For this to be treason, the government would have to have recognized this as a war by declaring it as such, and wars can only be declared against foreign states.
No formal declaration of war is necessary, per US Code 2331. A definition of the act of war includes, as I stated earlier, “armed conflict between military forces of any origin.” The group defines itself as a milita and has faced off against the US government and its agents. They have taken up arms, described themselves in military terms, have leadership and named the US government as it’s foe. If we look closer at the criteria for “domestic terrrorism” 1) they are in violation of US laws; 2) their actions were intended, if not to intidimidate or coerce citizens (although their presence alone would be enough to intimidate most citzens wanting to access the land), definitely to “to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;” 3) are with in the territorial jursidiction of the United States. Let’s also note that the local community of citizens are not supportive of the occupation and the Hammonds, the ranchers duly convicted of arson whom Bundy wanted released from prison, distanced themselves from him immediately through their lawyers. Their demand for federal lands equates to the loss of public land for private use. Many citizens see the actions of the group as an attack against the public and the common good.
Clearly there are a number of ways the statues can be interpreted which is why I support the full prosecution of the group’s members for sedition, domestic terrorism and treason. The arguments made throughout this discussion should be made in court and judgments made through a fair trial.
I don’t think their self-description is sufficient to make them a “military force”. Also if they are a military force, they cannot be guilty of terrorism, because terrorism is carried out by non-military actors. So if you charge them both with treason and with terrorism, you could at the very most get only one of the two.
I think the feds should “waco” these Mustang killers & deny their families any future use of federal lands. Just sayin
Thank you for this interesting discussion.
Is prosecution for sedition the only charge they should face or should the legal system charge them with with the theft of vehicles, destruction of property or other crimes specific to the situation? How about restitution for the cost of the police action and legal cases for years to come?
In my reading of statements the supporters and occupants have made I consider them to be mentally ill. I now have more respect for the law enforcement agents who have to keep track of and tolerate armed, anti-government, radical citizens on a daily basis.
I assume the reason the government has been tolerant of the rebels is to keep from inflaming the estimated c. 200,000 militia members in America and to avoid aggressive action like at Ruby Ridge. However, I think the rebels were given too much freedom and they should not have been tolerated as much as they have. They should not have been able to come and go as they please and the electricity and telephone service cut from the start.
For people who love guns they sure were stupid to commit a felony. The idea of denying them future use of federal lands is interesting.
I very much appreciate how federal lands are managed (mostly) and the Paiutes can essentially use there ancestral lands without technically “owning” it.