How to be a Good Person Without God
by Benjamin Studebaker
In many western societies, religion seems to be losing influence, particularly among young people. Many religious people argue that this threatens society’s moral frameworks. Without God, on what basis do we distinguish the good from the bad? Secularists often scoff at this question, resenting the implication that only the religious can be moral. And yet, many secularists are also moral subjectivists, who claim not to believe in any absolute sense of right and wrong, arguing that morality is culturally relative or a matter of individual taste. This does seem to imply that as religion weakens, the intellectual foundation of many of our substantive moral beliefs is being eroded, and that to the extent that secularists remain good people, it is often due to socialization and intellectual inertia rather than some truly substantive alternative. But it doesn’t have to be this way–there are excellent secular moral theories that do offer compelling objective alternatives to religious morality.
It is undoubtedly true that religion is giving ground in western countries. In many European countries, less than half the population affirms belief in god:
Even in the United States, religion is weakening. The number of people who will explicitly admit that they have no religious affiliation has risen to a full quarter among young people:
Those young people who do affiliate report less intense affiliations:
Service attendance has plummeted among the young:
As has daily prayer:
Importance of religion is falling:
Certainty about the existence of god is at an all-time low among Millennials:
A minority believe that the Bible is literally true, even among older generations:
Taken together, the indication is that fewer people are religious and that those who are religious are less certain about their beliefs and less confident that they know God’s will. Historically, people’s moral beliefs have had a lot to do with what they believe God commands. Based exclusively on religious beliefs, many people have historically been willing to kill others for having different religious beliefs or no religious beliefs at all. Others have condemned homosexuality or sacrificed animals. In some cultures, it has even been common practice to sacrifice children and babies to the gods. Many of these actions cause immense suffering and are thoroughly condemned by nearly all objective secular moral theories. How does religion practically motivate people to do these things?
Most religions operate on a remarkably simple set of principles. It goes something like his:
- There is a God.
- This God has things he wants you to do (i.e. “good” things) and things he does not want you to do (i.e. “bad” things).
- If you do good things and do not do bad things (or repent for the bad things that you do), God will send you to some heaven or paradise after you die.
- If you don’t do good things and you do bad things (or fail to repent for the bad things that you do), God will send you to some hell or terrible place after you die.
In sum, religious moralities operate on a core principle of selfish egoism–you do the things that God commands to receive a reward and avoid a penalty. Abiding by religious morality is consequently no different from following the law. Indeed, religious people often speak of morality in legal terms, calling it “God’s law”. For these people, disbelieving in God means disbelieving in meaningful consequences for bad actions. These people often claim that if there is no punishment for acting wrongly, we have no reason to avoid bad actions. This is because these people’s moral beliefs are entirely self-focused and egotist.
One of the great observations of our secular moral theorists is that there is a sharp distinction between morality and law, between what it is good to do and what someone commands. Derek Parfit discusses this difference in his opus, On What Matters. Parfit claims that morality is irreducibly normative and that while natural facts can inform our decisions by making us more aware of the likely consequences of our actions, they do not in themselves have moral content. Parfit believes that we have fundamental object-given reasons to do good things and avoid doing bad things. For instance, cutting off your son’s arm for no reason is wrong, because this causes your son to suffer for no reason, and suffering for no reason is intrinsically bad. There is no possible universe in which it would be good to suffer for no reason. It is beyond even the capabilities of God to make it good to suffer for no reason. Even if God himself commanded everyone to cut off the arms of their sons, this would not make this action good, because unnecessary suffering is intrinsically harmful. If God sent people to hell for refusing to cut off the arms of their sons, this would not make refusing bad–this would make God bad. Those who resisted this command knowing the penalty is damnation would be brave, courageous, and selfless. They would be good.
If God is good, his goodness cannot come merely from his power. The ability to punish does not bestow any moral authority whatsoever, because actions are good or bad irrespective of what any being, person, or organization believes. To offer any semblance of justification, those who would cut off the arms of their sons because God ordered them to do so would have to believe that God had some good reason for demanding this, that they were not being ordered to mutilate their sons for no reason. This would require an extraordinary level of faith not merely in God’s existence and power but in God’s benevolence.
Once we accept the core secular moral principle that it is intrinsically and objectively bad to suffer for no reason regardless of what any being thinks or demands, this principle has all kinds of implications and places very large demands on us. There is a great deal of suffering in the world, and if we genuinely believe that suffering is bad, we are obliged to try to alleviate this suffering even at substantial cost to ourselves, with no hope of recompense. The secular moralist recognizes a duty to relieve suffering even though no God will reward this behavior. Indeed, secularists typically recognize a duty to relieve suffering even when many people will take advantage of them or even try to punish them for doing so, even when doing so may cost them their lives. The life of a secularist is especially precious because there is no belief in heaven. Dead is dead.
Secular morality typically asks people to care about others even when those others will not reciprocate this care or will even actively seek to exploit the moralist, with no hope of reward. Consequently, many secularists fail to meet the demands of secular moral theory, which requires an extraordinary level of altruism and selflessness that goes far beyond anything required by any religious moral theory. This means that while many secular moral theories are objectively quite convincing on a theoretical level, they often fail to motivate people to undertake the massive sacrifices demanded in a practical context.
The core problem is the separateness of persons. Intellectually, we can recognize that suffering for no reason is bad not just for us, but for all beings. But we do not experience the suffering that these other beings experience–we are separate from them. So while we have very strong theoretical reasons to care about this suffering, in practice we find that these reasons do not compel us to undertake massive personal sacrifices. In Isaac Asimov’s Foundation series, Asimov explored the possibility that humanity one day might create a hive mind where the experiences of suffering and happiness are shared. Asimov rightly recognized that this would dissolve the separateness of persons and make it much easier for people to act morally. When they relieved another’s suffering, they would relieve their own suffering. The conflict between the selfish interest and the social interest would be eliminated.
In this way, Asimov tried to imagine a new set of conditions where we would believe that we had strong egocentric reasons to do good things and avoid doing bad things. It is immensely regrettable that human beings seem unable to do good things and avoid doing bad things simply because they are good or bad and for no other reason. Moral truth seems to be insufficiently powerful to motivate good action without some external factor that connects being good to being personally rewarded. Given that this is the case, we need practical secular moral systems that are more effective at making this connection.
How do we do this? I have some ideas.
To start, we need to recognize that even though we cannot directly experience other people’s happiness and suffering, we still benefit from their happiness and are harmed by their suffering in a great many ways when these people reciprocate with us and are part of our community. If we help our friends and family members to be happy and avoid suffering, they will be more able to help us in the same ways. If the other people in our society are happier and suffer less, they will be more economically productive and they will commit fewer crimes. We will see our living standards rise more rapidly, and we will be safer and happier ourselves. If people in foreign countries are happy and don’t suffer, we will benefit from trading with them, we are less likely to see influxes of refugees, and these foreign populations are less likely to dislike us or want to harm us. So we have some practical egotistic reasons to care about other people and to try to benefit them as much as they are willing and capable of benefiting us. We should recognize that when we exploit others, we encourage them to resent us and oppose us, damaging our relationship and making cooperation unsustainable in the long-term. Even if we are able to consistently exploit them, we will damage their psychological well-being, reducing their productivity and effectiveness. Even if we are pure egotists, we should recognize that we always have duties to reciprocate good behavior and to not exploit others. If we abide by those duties, we will have better lives. We will live in more productive and safer societies.
More radically, while it is not yet possible to join an Asimovian hive mind, it is currently possible to get cryonically preserved when you die. Places like Alcor are currently willing to freeze your body when you die and attempt to resurrect you in the future using undiscovered technology. We cannot be certain that this will work, because the technology is undiscovered. But if you can believe that it will or even that it might, you can be a secularist and still believe in a kind of life after death. If you are a good person and you make the world a better place, your future society will be better and consequently your future life will be better as well. If you are a bad person and you make the world a worse place, human civilization may not last long enough for the necessary technologies to be discovered, and you may never be revived. This gives you egocentric reasons to care about what the world will be like in the distant future, even for people who do not yet exist and may never exist. If we do not take action to deal with long-term problems like climate change or economic inequality, we may never have the kind of society that can revive us. To get an afterlife, we have to ensure that human civilization is sustainable and continues to grow and develop in a healthy way. Unlike religious moral doctrines in which people are sent to an afterlife based on the whims of God, cryonics asks us to earn our afterlife by contributing positively to our world and by avoiding damaging it in ways that might cause our society to stagnate or collapse.
Theoretically, the best kind of people would all abide by secular objective moral theories of the kind advanced by folks like Derek Parfit and Peter Singer, even at great cost to themselves. Unfortunately, real people seem unable to follow those doctrines without some confidence that they will be rewarded. But we do not need God to bestow rewards. We can bestow them on ourselves by creating a just legal system that helps people to reciprocate and cooperate freely without fear of being exploited. Perhaps we can even believe in cyronics and try to build the kind of society that can one day revive us and give us a great afterlife. In these ways, secularists can have moral beliefs that are every bit as robust, both in a theoretical and practical sense, as religious people.
I would chalk this up to some theory of relativity. Maybe it’s cyclical. Just as the world goes through warming and ice ages, perhaps religion comes and goes in importance. I mean, there was a time when the Greeks had many gods that were a big part of their daily chat and geography. That lost its charm after Rome played with it, I am sure. People moved on to other things…and then Christianity came along, and the fever fired up, again. Most recently, Scientology became a big buzz with celebrities speaking out about it. In a few years, people might think of that like some short-lived cult when the next wave of “try this” comes along. Maybe so many aspects of this life are just like the tides. They come into view and then fade away.
Sure, people can still be “good” or “moral” without Christianity/Catholicism, if those are going to annoy so many who hide their transgressions, play in the darkness and even support the images of evil. That’s a big reason, I think, religion is losing its hold. Not because it doesn’t matter. But, because more people are bending themselves and being bent to the darkness. And, as scary as that may seem to those still true to their faiths, maybe that too is cyclical. Yin and Yang, light and dark, ebb and flow.
The Christian/Catholic God is but an example, a model to live by. A recipe for good behavior passed down through the ages. Some of the rules get a lil fuzzy and confused through the grapevine, I am sure. It all boils down to people listening to the universe and their guts. The higher power will speak to them, either way. But, humans get so caught up in bashing each other and either rejecting or throwing themselves into religion. I am as opposed to atheists as I am to religious extremists.
“There is no possible universe in which it would be good to suffer for no reason.”
A substantial portion of life consists of various degrees of suffering. Absent any appeal to a transcendent reality, there is no reason for it. Wouldn’t it therefore be “good” to simply destroy all life? Such an action would also multiply in total “goodness” since it would eliminate all suffering for any conceivable future… ?
The position you’ve advanced here assumes that suffering cannot be outweighed by happiness. There are some philosophers who hold that view (David Benatar comes to my mind), but I think that happiness can outweigh suffering. We should however concede that life would be better without this unnecessary suffering, except insofar as this suffering is necessary for some amount of greater happiness.
[I was thinking Schopenhauer but Benatar works well enough.]
Are you then amending the quoted proposition such that it would now read, “There is no possible universe in which it would be good to suffer for no reason, except insofar as this suffering proves necessary for some [as yet unrealized and, thereby, uncertainly knowable] greater amount of happiness”?
And, if so, aren’t you well on your way to conceding a version of Leibniz’s theodicy?
Also, by what standard are you measuring or calculating “happiness”?
If you suffer so that you may be enjoy a greater amount of happiness, you do not suffer for no reason. I do not think that all suffering is necessary for happiness, but I think that many people’s lives contain more happiness than suffering and that this means their lives are, on the whole, good. Their lives would however be better if the balance between happiness and suffering were more lopsided in favor of happiness. I conceive of happiness fairly broadly in the eudaimonistic utilitarian sense, going beyond raw hedonism and including various kinds of self-actualization. I certainly disagree with Leibniz (I don’t believe free will is a coherent concept and I am not convinced that there exists an omnibenevolent god, so I am not persuaded that all suffering is necessary for happiness).
“If you suffer so that you may enjoy a greater amount of happiness, you do not suffer for no reason.”
This seems to have your morality “operate on a core principle of selfish egoism–you do the [good] to receive a reward…” and “consequently no different from following the law,” for which I believe you had critiqued “religious moralities.” –But at least those, as you describe them, rest on the power of a law-giver that is, at a minimum, substantially more knowledgeable than any individual human. Yours, on the other hand, appears to place you as the law-giver, or else makes law-setting subjective and just brings us right back to moral relativism.
It also strikes me that your proposed pursuit of a eudaimonism [even setting aside the issue of subjectivity with regard to defining ‘happiness’ and ‘suffering’], to say nothing of the “cost” required to decrease suffering in others, would insist that one trade a present happiness for the hope/promise of greater happiness tomorrow. Absent a trustworthy and properly capable agent to make that promise or secure that hope, what reason would I have to make that choice?
Or if you’re ejecting choice in the incoherence of free will, then how does your system generate any “ought” or “should”? If there are no choices, there are only necessities, and necessities are only amoral, no?
We not only might suffer so that we can enjoy a greater happiness, we might suffer so that others can enjoy a greater happiness. Secular moral theories often demand this from us, though most secularists fail to meet these demands when they are quite significant.
I hold objective views about morality of the kind held by Derek Parfit. Parfit holds that moral truths do not change merely because some person, people, organization, or being affirms them or denies them. They are irreducibly normative and object-given. The nature of suffering gives us an objective reason to avoid suffering, and the nature of happiness gives us an objective reason to pursue happiness. A relativist or subjectivist holds an entirely different view–they believe that one can simply decide for oneself what one desires and equate that with the good. So when some Hitler-type figure claims that genocide is good, the subjectivist or relativist cannot deny that for Hitler this is true. Parfit can deny it on the grounds that genocide causes suffering and that this suffering gives us a reason to reject genocide.
Now, it is certainly true that different people will find that different experiences make them happy or make them suffer. One person’s favorite television show may be another’s least favorite, and there are many aesthetic matters that are purely issues of taste. But happiness and suffering themselves remain objectively good and bad respectively.
Just because it is true that you cannot choose otherwise does not mean that some actions are not good and others are bad. If we have true moral beliefs, these beliefs will cause us to make good choices rather than bad ones, and this will give us and others better lives. When you try to persuade me of some moral truth, you cannot choose to do otherwise. If I am persuaded (or not persuaded), I cannot choose to be otherwise. But none of this changes the fact that if you are right and you persuade me and you change my behavior, this is good. We do not need to be able to change our behavior to recognize that behaviors that generate better outcomes are better, and our recognition of moral facts causes us to choose those kinds of better behaviors. This makes it worthwhile to ask moral questions–our moral discussions and beliefs will inform our action and improve it or worsen it, depending on whether or not they are true. Or, as Parfit puts it:
“If we don’t yet know what we shall decide, we are free in the sense that nothing will stop us from acting in certain ways, if we decide to do so. For practical purposes, it is only this compatibilist kind of freedom that we need. It is irrelevant whether, given our actual state of mind, some other decision would have been causally impossible.”
I do think that oftentimes we have reasons to believe that we are likely to enjoy some future happiness that makes it worthwhile to continue living even if we are presently unhappy. For instance, if I am hungry, I might be quite unhappy, but I might also realize that in 30 minutes I will be able to prepare a really splendid meal for myself, and this meal may very well be worth the wait. If I killed myself because I was hungry, I would probably be inaccurately weighing the balance of suffering and happiness in my life.
I guess I’ll have to read up on Parfit if I’m to be fair to the position (WP comments hardly seem adequate to the philosophical detail we’re getting to here), as I’m simply not following at all at this point. The language you’re using in relation to will and choice looks to me, on its face, immediately and obviously self-contradictory — so I’m thinking your meaning and my reading are radically disconnected somewhere.
I’m also not seeing your escape from relativism– you say suffering and happiness are objective but then say definitions of suffering and happiness are subjective… looks like (P&~P) to me. The relativist cannot condemn Hitler on any but subjective grounds, true, but how can you if Hitler defines happiness as being inversely proportional to the number of “undesirables” currently living in German lands?
Happiness is not open to arbitrary definition in the way you’re suggesting. It is a moral fact that when Hitler commits genocide, he creates a far greater sum of unhappiness than happiness, regardless of Hitler’s opinion on the matter. I agree that I can’t run all the way through Parfit’s arguments in a comment. We probably should bring this to a close with me heartily recommending On What Matters to you. But I will first try to say a little bit more about freedom and choice anyway. Parfit sees a difference between hypothetical freedom and causal freedom. We don’t have free will in a causal sense–we could not have decided other than how we decided. But we do have a much more limited hypothetical freedom, which does not meet the standard for free will but does give us enough freedom to make morality important. We have this hypothetical limited freedom if it is merely true that if we were to learn some new moral truth, this could and would cause us to make a different decision. So for instance, if you convince me that beating my son is wrong, my new moral belief will cause me to behave differently in the future toward my son. This is good irrespective of whether or not I have some kind of radical freedom to choose whether or not to continue beating my son given my beliefs. We have hypothetical freedom if changes in our beliefs can produce changes in our actions. We would have causal freedom if we could act independently of our beliefs or choose what we believe. Both of these forms of freedom are incoherent. We cannot choose what we believe or choose whether or not we are motivated by our beliefs. If you think this hypothetical freedom is extremely minimal and doesn’t really constitute free will, I’m inclined to agree with you, but it does justify moral inquiry because it would indicate that changes in moral beliefs can result in changes in actions. That would make moral questions extremely important.
I’ll put On What Matters on the list. Thanks for the exchange.
“For instance, cutting off your son’s arm for no reason is wrong, because this causes your son to suffer for no reason, and suffering for no reason is intrinsically bad.”
I believe this was covered in detail in Hemingway’s “A Farewell to Arms”
I know as a reformed Catholic, we were taught to do good things out of fear of repercussion but I didn’t really buy that then nor do I now. I simply think that life is easier, more productive and more satisfying when you strive to do good things. And hey, if there really are repercussions, then all the better for having avoided them. 🙂
A couple of quick observations:
1)My take on your graphical data is that people are, in general, less religious in their youth. In fact, the Gen X and Boomers are at least holding steady, if not trending moderately to steeply upward on religious issues as they age. Will they catch the generations when organized religion was a more important part of the larger social structure than it is now? Probably too early to tell,
2)I can only speak for Christianity, but your simplification of religious structures would be seen as overly “works centered”. Most Christian denominations believe that faith in the Savior is the primary qualification for salvation. Protestants believe that faith alone is necessary for salvation, while Catholics believe that that faith must be manifested through good works, but theologically, both value faith in God as the first and most important tenet for salvation. Catholics do believe that salvation can be lost through mortal sin, but, theologically, that’s through a willful, unrepentant separation from God’s love more so than the act of sin itself. It’s a fine point, but one worth your exploration if you revisit the point.
3)I’m glad that secular moralists are working to advance good in the world, and I wish you the very best in your quest for it. But to me, it’s the equivalent of building a house by swinging a stone. You could pound the nails in with it, but a hammer or a nail gun is more efficient, safer, and results in a sturdier structure.
Anyway, as always, thanks for your insight.
Yes, this “Like” was intentional! 🙂 It’s about time religious people gave up their claim to have a monopoly on goodness. It can’t be denied that (just like a man-made legal system), religion *can* have positive practical effects, making people believe they have selfish, egotistic reasons for being good to others. Unfortunately this has proved to be a very unreliable system, for the simple reason, I believe, that it’s trying to make people do good things for the wrong reasons – which can work in the short term, but ultimately isn’t reliable. With the result that, as Steven Weinberg so aptly put it…
You’ll always have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion.
Not many discussions of religion mention the “egoism” aspect… & I have not seen the role of motivation considered equitably in both the religious & secular domain. You’re always a good read Benjamin…
Only one ‘gripe’, if you can call it that – the (unavoidable?) reductive description of the entity called ‘God’/’Creator’ or whatever is responsible for existence.
Here is part of a post from Facebook which I hope adequately describes the problem:
Re: Cartoon from “Spirit Science”:
– Human being asks: “So why do you allow things like famine, war, suffering, disease, crime, homelessness, despair, etc. to exist in our world?”
– J.C. responds: “Interesting that you should bring that up as I was about to ask you the exact same question.”
– F.B. Comment:
“The real meaning of the unanswerable phissolofical question is:
Why did a Creator-of-absolutely-everything-that-exists (including, don’t forget, non-material things like: logic/illogicality; rationality/irrationality; natural laws like cause & effect; & every single possibility that is possibly possible…) create a world where the options of evil & suffering are possible? (e.g. ‘He’ could have made beings who are never prone to illness & disability; ‘He’ could have made beings who had no propensity for wrongdoing because they had no concept of what wrongdoing was, etc.).
‘He’ either created everything or ‘He’ didn’t create anything because ‘He’ can’t have created only some parts of ‘His’ creation & not others (but then that’s logical & ‘He’ doesn’t operate in a realm of logic because ‘He’ created logic…).
It’s funny how we all have difficulty grasping what the ‘nothing’-that-everything-was-created-from actually is (imagine just darkness & then try to remove it; imagine just space & then try to remove it… try to imagine a completely different system to those of ’cause & effect’ or time… try to imagine a new thing that bears no resemblance to anything in the physical world – that’s why aliens are slapping us in the face to let us know they’re here & we can’t sense them with our world-bound senses…).
It’s an ancient question which gave rise to the idea of having ‘Faith’ in a Creator despite not understanding (because earth-bound creatures can have no inkling of what ‘He’-who-is-outside-of- the-physical-world ‘thinks’… except ‘He’ doesn’t ‘think’ because it’s a human attribute ‘He’ created, etc. … just a little thoughtypoos…”
To discuss something, one has 1st to define what it is you are discussing or it gives rise to ‘misunderstandings’ & ‘talking at cross purposes’, etc. This is problematic when religion comes under discussion.
(Add to that the difficulties of dealing with ‘religion as prescibed’ & ‘religion in practice’, & its complex evolution throughout history – e.g. J.C. was a Jew yet St. Paul muscled in on St. Peter’s gig & founded Christianity in J.C.’s name…)
I have found that even the most secular of beings can at least acknowledge the (problematic) “logical” apprehension of whatever is responsible for existence, which I have tried to describe in the post above, without doing a ‘Richard Dawkins’. It sheds no light on whether ‘God’ is ‘good’ or ‘bad’… or some other ‘out of this world’ value judgement from beyond the physical realm.
If ‘religion’ can be described as ‘a philosophy of life’ (note: life, not the afterlife), rather than the reductive
“1.There is a God.” etc. …
– this personalises it (& it can be as complex or simple as the human being who adopts it), & then humans cannot ‘speak for ‘God”… they can also still be responsible for their own actions while confined to the physical realm.
That great chap J.C. is reported to have said words to the effect that ‘God’ is in ‘His’ own realm & ‘His’ creation is an entirely different realm… & I believe Wittgenstein said the same thing.
Soz I couldn’t delete this – see Comment below…
Not many discussions of religion mention the “egoism” aspect… & I have not seen the role of motivation considered equitably in both the religious & secular domain. You’re always a good read Benjamin…
Only one ‘gripe’, if you can call it that – the (unavoidable?) reductive description of the entity called ‘God’/’Creator’ or whatever is responsible for existence.
Here is part of a post from Facebook which I hope adequately describes the problem:
Re: Cartoon from “Spirit Science”:
– Human being asks: “So why do you allow things like famine, war, suffering, disease, crime, homelessness, despair, etc. to exist in our world?”
– J.C. responds: “Interesting that you should bring that up as I was about to ask you the exact same question.”
– F.B. Comment:
“The real meaning of the unanswerable phissolofical question is:
Why did a Creator-of-absolutely-everything-that-exists (including, don’t forget, non-material things like: logic/illogicality; rationality/irrationality; natural laws like cause & effect; & every single possibility that is possibly possible…) create a world where the options of evil & suffering are possible? (e.g. ‘He’ could have made beings who are never prone to illness & disability; ‘He’ could have made beings who had no propensity for wrongdoing because they had no concept of what wrongdoing was, etc.).
‘He’ either created everything or ‘He’ didn’t create anything because ‘He’ can’t have created only some parts of ‘His’ creation & not others (but then that’s logical & ‘He’ doesn’t operate in a realm of logic because ‘He’ created logic…).
It’s funny how we all have difficulty grasping what the ‘nothing’-that-everything-was-created-from actually is (imagine just darkness & then try to remove it; imagine just space & then try to remove it… try to imagine a completely different system to those of ’cause & effect’ or time… try to imagine a new thing that bears no resemblance to anything in the physical world – that’s why aliens are slapping us in the face to let us know they’re here & we can’t sense them with our world-bound senses…).
It’s an ancient question which gave rise to the idea of having ‘Faith’ in a Creator despite not understanding (because earth-bound creatures can have no inkling of what ‘He’-who-is-outside-of- the-physical-world ‘thinks’… except ‘He’ doesn’t ‘think’ because it’s a human attribute ‘He’ created, etc. … just a little thoughtypoos…”
To discuss something, one has 1st to define what it is you are discussing or it gives rise to ‘misunderstandings’ & ‘talking at cross purposes’, etc. This is problematic when religion comes under discussion.
(Add to that the difficulties of dealing with ‘religion as prescibed’ & ‘religion in practice’, & its complex evolution throughout history – e.g. J.C. was a Jew yet St. Paul muscled in on St. Peter’s gig & founded Christianity in J.C.’s name…)
I have found that even the most secular of beings can at least acknowledge the (problematic) “logical” apprehension of whatever is responsible for existence, which I have tried to describe in the post above, without doing a ‘Richard Dawkins’. It sheds no light on whether ‘God’ is ‘good’ or ‘bad’… or some other ‘out of this world’ value judgement from beyond the physical realm.
If ‘religion’ can be described as ‘a philosophy of life’ (note: life, not the afterlife), rather than the reductive
“1.There is a God.” etc. …
– this personalises it (& it can be as complex or simple as the human being who adopts it), & then humans cannot ‘speak for ‘God”… they can also still be responsible for their own actions while confined to the physical realm.
That great chap J.C. is reported to have said words to the effect that ‘God’ is in ‘His’ own realm & ‘His’ creation is an entirely different realm… & I believe Wittgenstein said the same thing.
Lots of good content on your blog, Benjamin; I plan on sharing it with people in my work.
I’m guessing (hoping) your thinking has evolved since you posted this. Your post strikes me as a rationalistic, outsider’s analysis of religion (Christianity mostly) typical in our day especially among the young people you consider here — those who regard Church with a flattened, merely-human understanding which misconstrues the God of the Bible and humanity in that light (i.e. God as impersonal, incompetent, or not who God says God is [a lover]). It’s a bit too immersed in the pitiable new atheism of Maher or Harris; they’re clever, but boy are they stale. You offer helpful critiques of religion and religious figures elsewhere and your political and social commentaries are insightful, but I can’t help but think that a deep (re-)reading of ‘The City of God’, for instance, with an intelligent person (or, even better, a group of people) of deep faith would correct your politics-as-ends and death as death conclusions, which are so sad and experientially untrue, I’m sure you’d agree. Or, perhaps more engagement with ‘simpler’ people from ‘less-developed’ countries as sources would open up new ways of recognizing a God who cares especially for the least among us and a life worth living even *through* suffering (and not its avoidance), in addition to Church as a pilgrim people journeying with God towards completion as offered in Lumen Gentium and Gaudium et Spes. Have you spent much time studying/ reflecting upon those documents?
I’d love to see another take on this topic in the future. It would make your other political and social commentary much more interesting and worthwhile.