Leftism and Determinism Part I
by Benjamin Studebaker
A thought occurred to me today–it is impossible to be a leftist without also being a determinist. Here’s why.
Leftists do not believe that individuals have special claims on property beyond purely what is pragmatic or efficient (and some leftists do not care about pragmatism or efficiency, either). For leftists, the only reason that it might be reasonable to pay say, a doctor more than one pays a secretary is that being a doctor requires more years of training and is, on the whole, a more difficult job. Consequently, we need to provide doctors with a larger incentive in order for the market to produce the number of doctors we require. We would never pay doctors more merely on the basis that they deserve more–leftists fundamentally disagree with the belief that anyone deserves more or less than anyone else.
A lot of policies come out of this. If we believe that no one is inherently more deserving, then the only reason to permit economic inequality is those practical reasons–the providing of incentives. This is encapsulated by Rawls’ second principle of justice:
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) They are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (b), they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
Rawls’ second principle is itself split into two parts. Here we are concerned specifically with “b”, the difference principle. The difference principle distributes benefits to the least advantaged members of society because there is no reason under Rawls and under mainstream leftism that the least advantaged deserve less than anyone else. The only thing preventing Rawls’ principles form leading to communism is the concern for maximising the benefit. Consider the following two states of affairs:
Society |
Poor Group Welfare |
Rich Group Welfare |
Total Welfare |
Rawlsopolis |
40 |
80 |
120 |
Marxtopia |
30 |
30 |
60 |
By desiring the “greatest benefit of the least advantaged”, Rawls has reasons to prefer Rawlsopolis to Marxtopia. He is a prioritarian rather than an egalitarian. This is the mainstream modern leftist view we’re talking about, not the communist stuff. By insisting on absolute equality, Marxtopia creates a perversity of incentive that actually reduces standard of living for the poor. Rawlsopolis protects against this, only redistributing to the worst off insofar as this does not remove the incentive to labour.
So the question I put to the reader here is why do leftists think that everyone is equally deserving of welfare except insofar as it undermines incentive? Why is a poor person otherwise just as worthy of income as a rich person?
The right very strongly disagrees with the left on this. Remember “you didn’t build that“? The right was furious about Obama’s claim that businessmen were not personally responsible for the success of their enterprises. Obama tried to back-peddle on the comment, but he had no business doing so, because “you didn’t build that” is precisely what leftists believe. Leftists don’t think that the rich are to credit for their success or that the poor are to blame for their failures. Leftists think sociological and natural forces determine who succeeds and who fails. People who succeed benefit from genetic advantages, better parenting, better education, more opportunity, more help from the state, and so on. People who fail lack these advantages and often possess their inverse–genetic disadvantages, bad parenting, bad education, less opportunity, less help from the state. To the extent that you are genetically gifted and enjoy a good environment, you succeed. To the extent that you are genetically shafted and suffer from a poor environment, you don’t.
These two running concepts, genetics and environment, are not merely the determiners of our economic or social success, they determine our behaviour more generally. If it was otherwise, the tenants of leftism would not hold. If it were the case that human beings had the ability to make decisions and choices independently of their genetics and environment, if they could contradict their nature or experience or transcend it somehow, then success or failure really would come down to sheer will or the lack thereof. Believing that success and failure is socially constructed entails a denial of the independent will. If all our beliefs and behaviours are the product of the traits we happened to have been born with and the experiences and upbringing we happen to have had, then there is nothing else left for which to account. All human beings are is an amalgamation of genetics interacting with environmental factors, and that’s it. The universe is determinist.
If we deny that the universe is determinist, there is no ground for objecting to the right’s argument that some people will themselves to success through virtue and others to failure through vice. If there is any other element, if there is any independent will, then some people really are fundamentally better people than others, are more deserving than others, and should be rewarded on that basis alone.
A lot of leftists, on some level, acknowledge determinism as true, but then they do a peculiar thing. They put their determinism in a box and do not permit it to influence their philosophy in other respects. Why do they do this? Some people consider the implications of determinism unsettling or unpleasant. It’s all well and good to say that other people don’t really have control over their behaviour and ought not to be blamed or credited for it, but leftists are often reluctant to self-apply determinism. They want to retain some belief in their own autonomy or ability to decide and make choices. Moreover, they often believe that, if they do not maintain this belief, it will be impossible for them to care at all about their lives, to be moral in any real sense, that their world views would collapse into nihilism. It would be okay to acknowledge that the world were determinist and then ignore it for the sake of our sanity if determinism were just a purely academic or philosophical question, but what I have hopefully shown you here is that it goes beyond that. Whether or not we are determinists has tremendous sway over our politics. If determinism is true, we can be leftists. If it’s false, we ought to be on the right.
So if we think leftism is correct, we must also think that determinism is correct, not merely in the “yes, technically, but keep it in a box” sense, but in a very real “this has implications for how we live” sense. It is inexcusable to maintain inconsistencies between our determinism and the leftist politics it entails and our broader moral theory and personal ethos. What other elements of our philosophy do we have to bring into consistency with determinism? And furthermore, how do we reconcile ourselves to what some perceive to be the disempowering gloom of a determinist worldview? I’ll have a go at answering these next time–after all, how could I do otherwise?
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Since this post involves determinism I decided to put this question to you here
This is a quote I took from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
“Gilkey and the others are apparently thinking in terms of a Newtonian world-picture, according to which the universe is like a great machine proceeding according to the laws disclosed in science. This isn’t sufficient for the hands-off, anti-interventionist theology of these theologians. After all, Newton himself, one hopes, accepted the Newtonian world-picture, and Newton proposed that God periodically adjusted the planetary orbits, which according to his calculations would otherwise gradually go awry. What Gilkey and his friends add, here, apparently, is determinism: the thought that the laws of nature together with the state of the universe at any time, entail the state of the universe at any other time. Here the classical source is Pierre Laplace:
We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its previous state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant a mind which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings that compose it—a mind sufficiently vast to subject these data to analysis—it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes. (Laplace 1796)
It is the Laplacian world-picture that apparently animates Gilkey, et al. It is worth noting, however, that determinism and the Laplacian world-picture don’t follow from classical science. That is because the great conservation laws deduced from Newton’s Laws are stated for closed or isolated systems. Thus Sears and Zemansky (1963):
The principle of conservation of energy states that the internal energy of an isolated system remains constant. This is the most general statement of the principle of conservation of energy. (p. 415)
Newton’s laws (as well as Maxwell’s later physics of electricity and magnetism) apply to isolated or closed systems; they describe how the world works provided that the world is a closed (isolated) system, subject to no outside causal influence. But it is no part of Newtonian mechanics or classical science generally to declare that the material universe is indeed a closed system. (How could a thing like that be experimentally verified?) Hence there is nothing in classical science (at least in this area) incompatible with God’s changing the velocity or direction of a particle, or a whole system of particles (or, for that matter, creating ex nihilo a full-grown horse). Energy, momentum and the like are conserved in a closed system; but the claim that the material universe is in fact a closed system is not part of classical physics; it is another metaphysical or theological add-on. So here there is no conflict between classical physics and special divine action in the world.
now disregarding the commentary o God how do you react to the part that says that there is no way to scientifically prove that the world is a closed and isolated system which is solely governed by the dictates of natural laws…..if I recall correctly the initial assumption for your what you view as an unquestionable belief i deterministic nature of the universe was that it is governed only by natural laws ad therefore these laws determine everything ad therefore the universe must, without question be deterministic. classical science can not prove that the material universe is a closed system. Therefore what is to say that the universe is not deterministic. Indeed ow the Laplacia picture of the universe which essentially says the universe is deterministic has been supplanted by the advent of quantum mechanics.
“According to quantum mechanics, associated with any physical system, a system of particles, for example, there is a wave function whose evolution through time is governed by the Schrödinger equation for that system. Now the interesting thing about quantum mechanics is that, unlike classical mechanics, it doesn’t specify or predict a single configuration for this system of particles at a future time t. The wave function assigns a value at t to each of the configurations possibly resulting from the initial conditions; by applying Born’s Rule to those values we get an assignment of probabilities to each of those possible configurations at t. Accordingly, we aren’t told which configuration will in fact result (given the initial conditions) when the system is measured at t; instead we are given a distribution of probabilities for the many possible outcomes.”
The question of whether or not the universe is a closed system is an interesting scientific and metaphysical question, but it does not impact the moral and political debate revolving around whether or not individual beings have free will.
Regardless of whether or not the universe is a closed system, it remains the case that a person’s actions are determined by the brain and body that individual is born with, a brain and body that the individual does not self-select. If you remove a person’s brain, a person loses all functionality. Unless people are their own authors of their own bodies and minds, their behavior is determined by the bodies and minds which nature (or God, if you prefer) has assigned. It may be possible in the future for individuals to design future people through genetic modification, but even in this case individuals are not the authors of their own minds, but of the minds of one another, and the first person to practice genetic modification of human beings will himself do so as a result of the way his mind was designed by nature (or God).
There may well be intervening forces external to the universe, but the important thing is that they are not human forces–they are not our wills. They might be the wills of deities, or extra-universal physical forces, but all of those forces would, from a human perspective, merely be other forms of determination residing outside the universe. Even if they act randomly or do not follow scientific laws, they would still not be within our power, so our claim to free will would still be null and void.
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[…] Studebaker, B. (2013, May 2). Leftism and Determinism Part I. https://benjaminstudebaker.com/2013/05/02/leftism-and-determinism-part-i/ […]