An interesting ethical question was put to me recently–what interest are teachers ethically obliged to serve or defend? I was given several options:
It’s an interesting opportunity to apply philosophy, so I’d like to explore it further.
As a utilitarian, whenever moral philosophy comes up, I always find myself having to answer some hypothetical designed to show how very clearly and obviously all morality cannot merely be about consequences by engaging some emotional, intuitive moral feeling meant to be common to all people. Too often, utilitarians accept this constant defensive position against all other values as their lot. Today I’d like to go on the offensive with a moral hypothetical of my own–the case of the worst of all possible universes.
If this appears to be “moral philosophy week”, bear with me–I just keep having interesting conversations on the subject. On a couple occasions this week, the topic of autonomy has come up, usually as a principle to contrast with my favoured principle, utility. It is said that when we prioritise what is useful, we invariably use other people as means to ends, and in so doing violate their autonomy, which deontologically held to be sacrosanct and inviolate. While I have made arguments concerning “using people” in the past, I find myself ultimately dissatisfied with the contractualist appeal I have often resorted to (i.e. that rational people in a Rawlsian original position would agree to be used from time to time for the benefit of others on condition that everyone else agreed to be used from time to time as well). What I would like to do is refute the value of autonomy more totally, and, thanks to an idea I had late last night, I think I am in a position to do it.
I had an interesting lecture today in which Peter Singer came up. Singer is an interesting philosopher in so far as he is, like me, a utilitarian and a consequentialist, but I nonetheless find myself from time to time in conflict with him. Today I seek to identify where precisely Singer and I differ, and why one should agree with me rather than with him.
I noticed an interesting consequence of the moral theory I outlined yesterday–if it’s true, it is not possible to be moral beyond a limited scope in the absence of a state. Let me explain what I mean. Continue reading “Can We Be Moral Without the State?”
Benjamin Studebaker 