Recently I’ve been going back over some Rawls, and in the course of doing so I came upon Rawls’ views on people with expensive tastes–those whose happiness requires unusually expensive goods. Rawls thinks that people are ultimately responsible for their tastes, having at some point in their lives freely chosen to cultivate them. I don’t think this is true. Here’s why.
Tag: Utilitarianism
Killing People for their Organs
Many people believe they have a knockdown objection to utilitarian moral theory. They argue that utilitarianism implies that it is morally permissible to kill people for their organs in order to save other people. They argue this conclusion is repugnant and obviously wrong, and that therefore utilitarianism must also be a repugnant, obviously wrong moral theory. Sophisticated critics attempt to explain why killing people for their organs is obviously wrong–they claim it uses people as a means to someone else’s ends. In this case, the people killed for their organs are said to be used as a means to the ends of those in need of transplants. As someone with strongly utilitarian leanings, it is important that I have a response to this case, so here goes.
This is Berk
I have invented a moral conundrum which I believe makes a strong point about moral philosophy. I wish to share it.
The Firing Squad Case
Today I’d like to evaluate the firing squad case, a hypothetical scenario used in moral philosophy in an attempt to demonstrate that individuals are morally obliged not to participate in collectively harmful activities. A collectively harmful activity is an activity that is harmful, but is only in aggregate. For instance, driving your car is not individually harmful, but it is collectively harmful–while your emissions will make no difference at all to the future climate of the planet, the emissions of everyone together will make a difference. Let’s have a look at the case.
Are People Equal?
Since Thomas Jefferson wrote that “all men are created equal”, we’ve pretty much taken equality as a given. The last couple hundred years of history could be viewed as one prolonged struggle for equality, whether taken from the perspective of colonists, racial, ethnic, or religious minorities, the working classes, women, and so on down the line. But how equal are we, really? And what, precisely, are we equal in? Too often we ignore these questions and resort to Jeffersonian platitudes. Not today.
Benjamin Studebaker 