As a utilitarian, whenever moral philosophy comes up, I always find myself having to answer some hypothetical designed to show how very clearly and obviously all morality cannot merely be about consequences by engaging some emotional, intuitive moral feeling meant to be common to all people. Too often, utilitarians accept this constant defensive position against all other values as their lot. Today I’d like to go on the offensive with a moral hypothetical of my own–the case of the worst of all possible universes.
Category: Politics
Concerning the nature of man and the state, and how best the latter can be structured to augment the former.
Begun, the Drone War Has
So yesterday, Rand Paul decided to use a filibuster–an old school, talking filibuster, no less–to stall the approval of Barack Obama’s proposed CIA head, John Brennan. The reason for this is that Rand Paul disapproves of the administration’s use of drones, specifically the administration claim that it could, in a sufficiently dire situation, kill a citizen within the territory of the United States with one. I’ve wanted to do the drone post for a while, but I haven’t gotten around to it, so Rand Paul can consider himself to have inspired me in this one rather trivial respect. Continue reading “Begun, the Drone War Has”
The Awesome Efficiency of Medicaid
The last time I talked about health care economics was a mere couple weeks into the lifespan of this blog. In that post, I noticed that Medicare’s costs, while increasing, have increased at a much slower pace than private insurance costs in the United States. Then, today, I ran across this study from Leighton Ku and Matthew Broaddus and learned that it’s not Medicare that should serve as the poster boy of the potential benefits of a “government takeover of healthcare”, it’s Medicaid and SCHIP. Let me show you. Continue reading “The Awesome Efficiency of Medicaid”
A Critique of Autonomy
If this appears to be “moral philosophy week”, bear with me–I just keep having interesting conversations on the subject. On a couple occasions this week, the topic of autonomy has come up, usually as a principle to contrast with my favoured principle, utility. It is said that when we prioritise what is useful, we invariably use other people as means to ends, and in so doing violate their autonomy, which deontologically held to be sacrosanct and inviolate. While I have made arguments concerning “using people” in the past, I find myself ultimately dissatisfied with the contractualist appeal I have often resorted to (i.e. that rational people in a Rawlsian original position would agree to be used from time to time for the benefit of others on condition that everyone else agreed to be used from time to time as well). What I would like to do is refute the value of autonomy more totally, and, thanks to an idea I had late last night, I think I am in a position to do it.
A Critique of Peter Singer
I had an interesting lecture today in which Peter Singer came up. Singer is an interesting philosopher in so far as he is, like me, a utilitarian and a consequentialist, but I nonetheless find myself from time to time in conflict with him. Today I seek to identify where precisely Singer and I differ, and why one should agree with me rather than with him.
